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DebateOn the resuscitation of clinical freedom
Amanda Burls
Abstract
Background: This paper is a response to the suggestion by Sacristán et al that clinicians can increase their clinical 
freedom by undertaking individualised economic analyses that demonstrate that interventions, which at a population 
level do not reach conventional thresholds of cost-effectiveness, do so in particular patients.
Discussion: In this reply, I question the presumption that "clinical freedom" is necessarily desirable and go on to argue 
that, even if it is, the proposal that clinicians should do individualised economic evaluation is flawed. Firstly, the 
additional clinical choice that may be gained from individualised economic analyses that demonstrate that an 
intervention, generally considered not to be cost-effective, is cost-effective in a particular patient, is likely to be 
counterbalanced by other analyses that produce the converse result (i.e. that an intervention that is cost-effective at a 
population level may not be so in a particular patient) - a complementary consequence, which is ignored by Sacristán 
et al in their paper. Secondly, the skills and time required to do an individualised economic analysis are likely to exceed 
those of most clinicians. Thirdly, and most importantly, asking clinicians to make rationing judgements at the point of 
care is a threat to patient trust and can harm the doctor-patient relationship.
Summary: Individualised economic evaluations are neither a desirable nor feasible method for increasing clinical 
choice.
Background
This paper is a response to the suggestion made by Sac-
ristán et al in this publication that clinicians can increase
their clinical freedom by undertaking individualised eco-
nomic analyses to demonstrate that interventions, which
at a population level do not reach conventional thresh-
olds of cost-effectiveness, do so in particular patients [1].
Discussion
Clinical Freedom
When in 1983 Hampton declared that clinical freedom -
"the right... of doctors to do whatever in their opinion was
best for their patients" - was dead, he added:
"Clinical freedom should, however, have been stran-
gled long ago, for at best it was a cloak for ignorance 
and at worst an excuse for quackery. Clinical freedom 
was a myth that prevented true advance."[2]
In the early days of evidence-based medicine (EBM),
some opposed it on the grounds that it threatened clinical
freedom. However, the absurd notion that knowledge,
because it reduces the number of choices that can be sen-
sibly made, somehow erodes freedom was soon laid to
rest [3]. It was not a hard battle: the ridiculousness of
equating ignorance with freedom was derided long before
the phrase "evidence-based medicine" was coined. As
Archie Cochrane wrote while reflecting on what he had
learnt as prisoner of war:
"What I decided I could not continue doing was mak-
ing decisions about intervening (for example pneu-
mothorax and thoracoplasty) when I had no idea 
whether I was doing more harm than good. I remem-
ber reading a pamphlet (I think from the BMA) extol-
ling the advantages of the freedom of British doctors to 
do whatever they thought best for their patients. I 
found it ridiculous. I would willingly have sacrificed 
all my medical freedom for some hard evidence telling 
me when to do a pneumothorax ..." [4]
Individualised economic analyses
Nonetheless today Sacristán et al resurrect the idea that
"Evidence-based medicine ... has contributed to augment
the feeling that clinicians play a secondary role in the ther-
apeutic decision process"[1] and propose a new approach
to restore clinical freedom.
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The approach proposed is the use of cost-effectiveness
analysis at the individual patient level - a suggestion that
will be counterintuitive, and perhaps even abhorrent, to
many clinicians: most clinicians would not relish telling
their patient that they have chosen not to give him or her
an effective treatment because the resource required
would benefit someone else more. Given that efficiency
decisions are about saying "no" to some interventions in
some circumstances, can using economic evaluations
enhance clinical freedom as Sacristán et al suggest?
While it may be easy to convince clinicians that ignorance
is undesirable, and what we need are treatments that have
been shown to be effective, it is harder to convince them
that denying patients effective treatments, on the
grounds that they are too expensive, enhances clinical
care. As one paediatrician proudly proclaimed at a
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE) meeting I attended, "I am not interested in eco-
nomics - I am a doctor". Even Archie Cochrane, when
campaigning in the 1930s to get a National Health Ser-
vice, chose the slogan: "All effective treatments must be
free" for his banner [4].
Part of the reason why Sacristán et al think that individ-
ualised cost-effectiveness analyses can enhance clinical
freedom may be because they almost totally ignore the
fact that economic evaluations may imply that a patient
should not be treated. Instead they focus solely on exam-
ples where a policy decision not to recommend a treat-
ment because it does not reach an acceptable willingness-
to-pay threshold could be challenged on the grounds that
this is not the case for a particular patient. It is this spe-
cial pleading, using economic arguments to establish that
one's own patient is different, that Sacristán et al envisage
will furnish clinicians with the vaunted clinical freedom.
Ever since NICE's inception, which formally added the
"fourth hurdle" of having to demonstrate that an inter-
vention is cost-effective before it is recommended for use
in the NHS, when there has been a negative decision
about a new intervention, sponsoring organisations have
tended to argue either that the cost-effectiveness thresh-
old is too low in this particular circumstance or condition
or that the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of
their product really lies within a range considered to rep-
resent a good use of health resources. (Industry spon-
sored economic evaluations tend to make overly
optimistic assumptions resulting in ICERs that are much
more favourable to their product than those produced by
independent researchers [5]). The pharmaceutical indus-
try has often battled against policy decisions not to rec-
ommend interventions that are not cost-effective and
sought to reverse or get around them by arguing, for
example, that there are sub-groups in which an interven-
tion is indeed cost-effective, or that patient utilities are
different from those that were used to inform the policy
decision. Sacristán et al take a similar approach but sug-
gest that clinicians apply these arguments at the individ-
ual patient level. They illustrate their case by using
concrete examples in which an intervention becomes
cost-effective in an individual patient because of their
greater potential for benefit or likelihood of adherence, or
because a different comparator (i.e. the alternative treat-
ment that would have been used in the particular patient
or context) is more appropriate, or because the patient
has different values (e.g. utility of different outcomes).
Are Sacristán et al right that this approach could
increase the treatment choices available to clinicians?
Certainly they are right that some treatments are likely to
be cost-effective in some people but not in others. Palivi-
zumab, a prophylactic treatment to prevent serious ill-
ness from respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), is a good
example. In most adults and children RSV infection is
asymptomatic or produces mild respiratory illness, and
palivizumab is expensive. In some children, however, RSV
can lead to life-threatening illness and death. The key to
the cost-effective use of palivizumab is being able to iden-
tify the subset of children who are likely to be at most risk
of serious illness [6]. If we can do this, we can treat this
group even though the drug is not a good use of money
when used unselectively in the licensed indication. How-
ever the counterpart to recognising that it is a good use of
resources in some, is the recognition that it is a poor use
of resources in others. Sacristán et al's arguments tend to
be lopsided, however, focusing mainly on examples of
why an intervention that is not generally cost-effective
could reach an accepted willingness-to-pay threshold in
some patients. They neglect the complementary and con-
verse situations when a generally cost-effective interven-
tion would not be cost-effective for a particular patient.
Moreover, their proposal is unrealistic - most clinicians
do not have the skills or time to undertake an individual-
ised economic evaluation to establish the effect of differ-
ent risk factors and utilities. The palivizumab economic
evaluation [6] required skilled systematic reviewers,
health information specialists, statisticians and mathe-
matical modellers to identify and define the sub-groups
in which the drug reaches conventional levels of cost-
effectiveness. To attempt this at an individual clinician/
patient level, if not unfeasibly demanding, would inevita-
bly carry a large opportunity cost in time for a clinician.
I believe that Sacristán et al also fail to appreciate fully
the nature of the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors
need to be able to relate to the individual patients in front
of them as their strong advocate, treating them in a way
that, after duly taking into account the patient's values
and the constraints of service within which they are
working, will produce maximal benefit for the patient.
Requiring doctors to make rationing decisions at the
point of care has the potential to seriously undermine the
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doctor-patient relationship and patient trust [7]. There-
fore, I would argue that rationing decisions are best made
at a population level, where the opportunity costs can be
appropriately taken into account. The analyses on which
such policy decisions are based should include consider-
ation and evaluation of variable risk factors and utilities
that might enable identification of sub-groups in which
the estimated ICERs differ to a degree that has different
implications for practice. The policy decisions that result
from this process create and define the constraints within
which clinicians must then work and strive to do the very
best for their patients. (This could include informing a
patient that there are potentially effective treatments that
cannot be prescribed within the service in which care is
being provided.)
Given Hampton's observation that clinical freedom
died "crushed between the rising cost of new forms of inves-
tigation and treatment and the financial limits inevitable
in an economy that cannot expand indefinitely"[2], it is
ironic that the very methods used to manage the tension
are now being proposed as the means for its resuscita-
tion.
Summary
Individualised economic evaluations are neither a desir-
able nor feasible method for increasing clinical choice:
additional clinical choices gained from individualised
economic analyses are likely to be outweighed by those
producing the converse result; the skills and time
required are likely to exceed those of most clinicians; and
asking clinicians to make rationing judgements at the
point of care is liable to undermine patient trust.
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